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Abstract. This paper presents a cyber-physical systems modelling lan-
guage for capturing and describing health-based critical infrastructures.
Following this practice incident response plan developers are able to
model and reason about security and recovery issues in medical cyber-
physical systems from a security requirements engineering perspective.
Our work builds upon concepts from the Secure Tropos methodology,
where in this paper we introduce novel cyber-physical concepts, relation-
ships and properties in order to carry out analysis of incident response
plans based on security requirements. We illustrate our concepts through
a case study of a radiological department’s medical cyber-physical sys-
tems that have been infected with the WannaCry ransomware. Finally,
we discuss how our modelling language enriches security models with in-
cident response concepts, guiding plan developers of health-based critical
infrastructures in understanding cyber-physical systems vulnerabilities
and support decision making at a tactical and a strategic level, through
semi-automated secure recovery analysis.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems modelling language; Meta-model;
Incident response; Security requirements engineering
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a Security Incident Response Modelling Language
(SIRML) to capture incident response (IR) concepts. When a hacker is able to
damage medical equipment by taking control of devices, the best a health care
organization can hope for is that the cyber-physical attack will be identified early,
the medical systems will shut down without causing further damages/harm and
normal operation will be restored in short-time. When attacks have occurred,
decisions cannot be made on the go. There is a need for a structured approach
to thwart adversarial attempts making changes to systems and their compo-
nents. Because, once the security perimeter of the corporate infrastructure is
penetrated, the industrial systems are exposed to attacks that will be generated
from inside an organization. Incident response planning is also important to be-
come more automated and dynamic, as attackers can use common responses as
triggers for further attacks [5].
This work builds upon the Secure Tropos [18] modelling language and extends
concepts, attributes and relationships to allow the cyber-physical aspect to be
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represented along with the view of IR as integral part of security. The SIRML
is part of a broader research effort to create a methodology which will allow
the modelling of health-based IR, supporting safety and security constraints,
prioritizing to protect patients. This paper contributes to the current body of
knowledge by (C1) providing a meta-model for cyber-physical systems (CPS),
aligning concepts of security and IR, (C2) defining concepts, attributes and
relationships to model at an operational, tactical and strategic level secure IR
plans and (C3) presenting the graphical notation that can be used to instantiate
the SIRML in order to facilitate further analysis, common understanding and
assessment of recovery plans from heterogeneous incident response teams (IRTs),
which can consist of managers, medical equipment technicians, engineers, IT
sub-teams and security experts.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
secure recovery meta-model and explains in more detail the newly introduced
concepts, relationships and notation. In Section 3 a case study is discussed to
demonstrate how the SIRML can be utilized. In Section 4 the related work is
briefly presented. Finally, while Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing
its content and contributions, it also discussing language limitations and future
research directions.
2 The Secure Incident Response Modelling Language
In this section the SIRML, that enables the modelling of CPS IR plans from a
security requirements engineering point of view, is presented. Firstly, the meta-
model of the secure recovery language is introduced, which extends and builds
upon the Secure Tropos modelling language [18]. The current version of the
SIRML meta-model is shown in Fig. 1. To distinguish the inherited from Secure
Tropos concepts from those newly introduced, colours are used. The concepts of
the model that are white are used as in Secure Tropos and their definitions can
be found in [18], unless specified otherwise. On the other hand, the novel secure
recovery concepts are coloured with green (bronze), grey (silver) and yellow
(gold). The different colours indicate the recovery stage that a plan refers to and
range from operational to tactical and strategic.
2.1 SIRML Introduced Concepts and Attributes
We now present our security IR extensions, highlighting each addition of a con-
cept through a definition, description and explanation of the main reason that
needs to be introduced at a metamodelling level. Furthermore, in this subsection
we present attributes in order to describe an instance of a concept in more de-
tail. Attributes allows the IRT to provide both abstract and technical details to
instances of a concept, therefore supporting varying degrees of granularity when
describing the system or/and infrastructure under design. The range of values
of the attributes of the SIRML concepts are shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 1. The Secure Incident Response Language Meta-model.
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Cyber Resource is a digital entity that is part of an infrastructures function
that includes different types of software (i.e. operational system, forensic tool-
kits and digital badges). At a detection level, it can indicate the source of an
attack precisely. It is a necessary concept for the designation of duties to IT sub-
team. Mission represents a sub-goal that cannot fail during an attack due to its
criticality for a CI. This concept is helpful for an IRT to prioritize resources at
a tactical recovery stage. Physical Resource stands for the kinetic aspect of a
system which can include controllers, switches, actuators, timers, field devices,
active medical devices, meters and similar entities. At a detection level it can
assist the inspections planning of the engineering sub-team of an IRT. This
concept is necessary for the designation of duties to engineering sub-teams with
different areas of specialization e.g. mechanical, electrical, biomedical.
Incident stands for the intentional unauthorized access to a system, service
or resource of a CI or the compromise of a system’s security properties (i.e. CIA
triad, CO2 triad). This concept differentiates an event and a threat clarifying
that an incident is successful and has malicious intent. Aggregates one or more
attacks as attempts to exploit a vulnerability and together they can constitute
an incident. From there, the planning can face the particular aspects of an in-
cident and examine its possible propagation in order to identify the root cause
and predict any propagation attempts and cascading effects. Detection Mecha-
nism includes the security means used primarily from an infrastructure within
a particular threat scenario for detection purposes.It allows IRTs to design how
they are going to collect information for a possible attack in order to support
management decisions. Mitigation Mechanism is used for security means that
are utilized primarily from an infrastructure within a particular threat scenario
for mitigation purposes. It enables IRTs to plan relocation, isolation of resources,
conducting impact assessment and signing to each resource a priority towards
the stabilization of an attack. Recovery Mechanism is for security means used
primarily from an infrastructure within a particular threat scenario for recovery
purposes. It permits IRTs to model the uncontaminated, replaced, reintegrated
resources and the means needed for those action to be achievable.
2.2 SIRML Introduced and Extended Relationships
In this subsection we outline the relationships linking together concepts from
recovery and security requirements engineering domains. We now define the re-
lationships in our modelling language by building upon the meta-model in the
previous section.
Specialization of Mission: A mission is a critical part of an activity that needs
to be protected even when an incident in the form of a cyber-physical attack has
been successful. When recovery for an individual responder is designed this mis-
sion can become more fine-grained. This becomes particularly important in the
long term planning and the concept of strategic mission. Based on this concept
activities and relocation of resources can be modelled along with other decisions
and specifying the actors that will perform them, showing the different time
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interval for the applicability of such recovery plans, focused on security. Hence,
the specialization of a mission is represented with an inheritance relationship.
Fig. 2. The Secure IR Concepts’ Attributes.
Specialization of a Security Mechanism: A security mechanism can be decom-
posed to detection mechanism, mitigation mechanism and recovery mechanism.
These subcategories of security mechanisms have different functions within an
incident response plan and its phases. These phases are commonly referred as
preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery, lessons learned
and should not be confused with the different child concepts of security mecha-
nism. To indicate this sharing of common behaviours among detection, mitiga-
tion, recovery and security mechanisms we depict there relationships using the
inheritance arrow.
Resource Reflexive Association: The reflexive association among resources
occur as the resource class can perform different tasks and forms various associ-
ations among concepts of the same class, as well as other classes. For example,
a medical device, which is a form of resource, works in a hospital and can be
an X-ray scanner, a defibrillator, an anesthetic machine, a medical laser or a
medical image storage device. If the X-ray scanner is storing images in a medical
image storage device then there relationship could be modelled as two instances
of the same class that communicate with each other.
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Incident Reflexive Association: Incidents are referring to cyber-physical at-
tacks that commonly described as been wrapped, usually inside exploit kits. The
execution of one attack triggers a series of other attacks. In some cases they mul-
tiply and spread. In order for the modelling language to able able to show that
an incident can associate, encapsulate, support or generate another incident,
the reflexive association is used. For instance, a ransomware replicates itself in
crucial locations of a system as for instance when it reboots and displays the
ransom message. In this case the incident reflexive association will be used to
connect the ransomware.exe with its copies in AppData, Start menu and root
directory.
Exploits: The exploits relationship indicates that the incident concept con-
nects with a vulnerability through this form of relationship. This relationship
can specify if the actual attack is preventable. A vulnerability can be the tar-
get of one or more incidents due to the existence of relationships from a range
of attacks, indicating that an incident aims to exploit a vulnerability and this
attempts are expressed through the relationship exploitss. For instance, the Wan-
naCry attack was exploiting with the EternalBlue exploit tool the vulnerability
CVE-2017-0144 and with the DoublePulsar attack with related vulnerabilities
CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146, CVE-2017-
0147 and CVE-2017-0148.
2.3 SIRML graphical and textual notation
In this section we present the visual notation of the modelling language. The dia-
gramming notation is considered an important aspect of the modelling language
as it can facilitate communication and assist problem solving [9]. The graphi-
cal notation is visualized using a set of diagrammatic components, where each
concept in the modelling language is mapped to an unique visual vocabulary in
the form of a notation. The shapes of the visual vocabulary were chosen based
on the theory of the ”physics” of notation [17]. The instance syntax is further
discussed as it offers a textual encoding of the concrete syntax which provides
an one-to-one mapping of a concept from our meta-model to an instance of a
concept. The purpose of the instance syntax is to provide a formal representation
of concept instances, in a machine readable format in order to perform analysis
on recovery models through tool support. Thus, the instance syntax allows the
unambiguous encoding of concepts in a textual format, which describes the in-
stantiated concepts from a secure recovery model to facilitate security analysis
within the context of recovery. The visual notation of the SIRML is shown in
Figure 3.
Starting from the parent concept of mission and its child the strategic re-
covery mission, both are represented diagrammatically with the same shape,
shown in Figure 3, but the child differentiate from the parent concept with
the use of a line as part of the shape. Here another important difference can
be noticed in the instance syntax. The mission description can take the form
MIS(DES,GR,TER,MOD,ST). In the instance notation DES gives the descrip-
tion of a mission, GR clarifies the granularity, TER specified the terrain or defer-
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Fig. 3. Key of graphical notation extensions
ently the area/aspect analyzed, MOD specifies the mode of the mission and ST
explicitly states the state of a mission. For example, a DES can be mitigation of
ransomware attack, GR operational requirement, TER hospital, MOD extensive
and ST open. This can be expressed from an instance syntax as MIS(ransomware
attack mitigation, operational requirement, hospital, extensive, open). In a simi-
lar manner the concept strategic recovery mission can be expressed in the form
of an instance syntax as STRMIS(PH,DES). Here the PH denotes the phase of
a particular recovery mission and the DES describes in more detail the strategic
recovery mission context. For instance, a strategic recovery mission can be at
the PH of planning and in more detail its DES can be among the lines of patch
vulnerability planning. This will generate an instance syntax STRMIS(planning,
patch vulnerability planning).
Another important concept in the modelling language is that of security
mechanisms, borrowed from Secure Tropos and extended to the specialized de-
tection, mitigation and recovery mechanisms. These types of mechanisms are
useful at different stages of security that relate directly with the broader scope of
incident response. The graphical syntax is presented in Figure 3 and their generic
instance syntax can be described as SECMEC(CAT,TYP,DES,NAM,ST,
VEC,FUN,COS). Based on this syntax CAT stands for the category, TYP for
the type of the security mechanism, DES for the description as in the rest of the
concepts that have been explored, NAM for the name of the specific mechanism,
ST for the state that the mechanism is assessed to be while under conditions of
a cyber-physical attack, VEC is referring to the vector and FUN to the func-
tion that a mechanism primarily performs. Whereas this instance syntax take
the form of RECMEC(DES,TYP,CAT,NAM,VEC,FUN) for the recovery mech-
anism and remains pretty similar for the rest of the security mechanisms.
Secure Tropos does not use risk as one of its concepts. However, a recovery
plan needs to incorporate the concept of risk. This takes the form of the residual
exposure. As a recovery plan attempts to face risks deriving from a cyber-physical
attack, even after planning an IRT needs to be aware of what are the remaining
areas of exposure for a system/infrastructure that is examined. In instance syn-
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tax terms this concept takes the form RE(DUR,TYP,CON), where DUR stands
for the estimated duration that this exposure remains, TYP is the type of the
exposure and CON denotes the confidence that such an attack will take place.
The graphical representation is a blue rectangle with sharp and rounded corners.
An example can be remaining malware code that was in the system for sixteen
hours before detection. The type of threat is cyber as it has the form of software
and there is actual confirmation that this exposure has occurred. In an instance
syntax the same concept will be expressed as RE(16 hours, Cyber, Confirmed).
The final concept that is modelled is the measure. The measure has as in-
stantiation syntax MET(LEGC,RESC,LREV,TRC,QREC). All the attributes
represent complex types that are specified in the reasoning support of the frame-
work that due to space limitations is not included in this paper. LEGC stands
for the legal costs, RESC for the costs of the resources used or planned to be
used, the LREV for the revenue that has been lost due to recovery processes,
TRC for the trust that has been lost due to the cyber-physical attack including
the employees of the CI and QREC for the quality assessment of an incident
response plan. The graphical representation of the measure concept is shown in
Figure 3.
3 WannaCry Case Study
In this paper we present a case study based on the WannaCry ransomware attack,
which in 2017 affected CIs at a global scale [16]. According to the National Audit
Office [20] ”at least 81 out of the 236 trusts across England” were affected either
because the attacked had infected them or because they disconnected/shut down
resources to prevent a possible exploitation or aggravation of the attack [20]. As
a result, ”603 primary care and other NHS organisations were also infected,
including 595 GP practices.” It is important here to stress that this attack was
not targeting health-care. Still the implications were disruptions of health-based
CI’s normal operational workflow that resulted to cancelled appointments for
patients and the necessity to redirect ambulances [16]. This attacks have the
capabilities to impact MCPS when looking for specific targets like unpatched
legacy operating system devices.
Based on this attack, a fictional scenario is examined where a hospital’s
network has been hit from a datalocker ransomware attack. The attack was
detected when a hospital employee who saw a pop-up message in a hospital’s
workstation, warning him/her that the computer is encrypted and a ransom
needs to be paid before a timer expires. The hospital is cyber-aware and does
not by its policy pay ransom. However, the hospital is conscious of the need to
recover from the ransom-ware attack. SIRML approaches recovery at three levels,
generating interconnected but different views of an event/incident. These views
are: (a) Operational Secure Recovery View (OSRV): It instantiates the
preventive measures that a CI uses along with processes, tools and mechanisms
to identify that an event/incident is occurring. (b) Tactical Secure Recovery
View (TSRV): It models the defensive posture of a CI in order to contain an
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attack and/or eradicate it. (c) Strategic Secure Recovery View (SSRV): It
models the after incident activities that take place in order to restore and recover
from an attack. Moreover, it initiates a lessons learned process that feedback the
OSRV and TSRV.
Due to space limitations, we have modelled partially the SSRV of the mission
to recover from ransomware attack. The SSRV instance in Figure 5, was gener-
ated using the SIRML proposed in this paper. The strategic aspect of recovery
consists of the longer planning and execution; it is supported by measures of
events/incidents/attacks and improves with feedback the overall recovery plan.
Firstly, we describe actors and their roles, such as ”IRT” who plays a substantial
role for the achievement of the overarching strategic recovery mission of man-
aging operating systems through their life-cycle and in particular in terms of
patching activities and bugfixes that relate even closer to security. We model
the vulnerable resources identified individually in the TSRV within sets of re-
sources that share common characteristics relevant to a long-term recovery plan.
An example resource set, in our case study (see Fig5), contains ”legacy Windows
operating systems”.
Fig. 4. General Ransomware TIRV
For a longer time frame of planning recovery activities and assessment of
applied recovery plans, measures can guide the overall process. These measures
can exist at an actor level, like the timelines of bugfixes and at an infrastructure
level, such as quality measures for ransomware tactical recovery, which is affected
from the effectiveness with which the IRT has collaborated with external to
the Hospital H third parties, that were presented at the OSRV. But, a secure
recovery needs also to consider the residual exposure from an attack. In the case
of WannaCry, malware might be still within the hospitals network. Additionally,
backdoors might persist in medical equipment. This can iteratively feedback the
secure TSRV that can be enhanced to incorporate these newly identified residual
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Fig. 5. WannaCry partial strategic secure-recovery view
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threats in its containment policy and defensive posture. A represenatation of the
ransomware is given in Fig. 4 as part of the TSRV.
The contribution here is that by associating recovery properties related to
cyber-physical attacks with security concepts, we are able to refine the specific
recovery needs of each resource and resource set including their dependencies at
a modelling level. Thus, the benefit is three-fold: firstly, by using the SSRV, the
recovery team can debrief, argue and reason about their decisions that relate
to longer term plans. Their explanation can be based on Measures and their
secure recovery performance can be assessed from Residual Exposure related
attributes. For example, attacks against CIs like WannaCry, Petya/GoldenEye
and ExPetr are examples of ransomware attacks that they have caused harm
except from the NHS, UK’s public health services provider, also to unnamed
medical facilities in the U.S. [8], the Heritage Valley Health System, that runs
hospitals and care facilities in Pittsburgh [10] and to Merck one of the largest
pharmaceutical companies at a global scale [6]. If WannaCry SSRV indicating the
residual exposure from the application of patches would have been understood,
then an enhanced TSRV would have been modelled and applied to cover the
vulnerable MCPS from attacks that spread in multiple ways. Meaning, that
attacks like Petya/GoldenEye and ExPetr could be avoided or mitigated more
effectively before they cause damage.
Secondly, the OualityOfRecoveryPlan could be estimated based on prede-
fined indicators, sampling and application of relevant tools and methods. In this
manner, a quantification approach to more quality-based requirements can be
attempted. Besides, as this analysis will take place at a requirements stage, an
estimation of which strategic plan is suitable but also affordable for an infras-
tructure can be found, in comparison with other alternatives that have as focal
point the proposed conceptual modelling language.
Thirdly, our SIRML allows forensic teams to apply ICS-CERT [23] recom-
mendations by collecting date, times, mitigation, response and recovery plans
applied along with the particular resources involved. The forensic team can be
in a position to decide based on these concepts from what active CPS data have
to be captured before a tactical plan is applied and how to shut down a CPS to
preserve forensic evidences. It also supports then to co-examine heterogeneous
security mechanisms and decide when such a mechanism can change the envi-
ronment of forensic interest in a way that will impede discovery. For example
an anti-virus run might cause such modifications. Moreover, changes in other
resources can have the same effect at a hardware, software and firmware level.
By creating a recovery plan, IRTs can consult forensic investigators at a design
level as of what actions might hinder a forensic inquire and identify those re-
covery processes that need to be supported from human resources with forensic
expertise.
Overall by using all three views we are able to model in detail the data
required for secure recovery at an organizational, tactical and strategic level,
how the data permeates through the physical components of an MCPS, the
jurisdiction due to the geographical location, and the specific information of the
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enabling cyber components including networking and communications. Based
on the information elicited through these concepts, we are then able to model
the secure recovery concepts such as vulnerabilities in an MCPS along with
threats, security constraints and detection, response and recovery plans through
security mechanisms and recovery activities, derived from health-based goals
and activities. Thus, our work provides a secure recovery modelling language
for health-based CIs enabling IRTs to express and model MCPS recovery needs,
understanding the close interconnection between MCPS and a patient’s care.
4 Related Work
Many security requirements engineering (SRE) methodologies have been pro-
posed with increasing intensity the last fifteen years. A number of these method-
ologies use as fundamental components the concepts of assets and their associ-
ated risks. Mead et al. published the Security Quality Requirements Engineering
(SQUARE) methodology that utilises a broad spectrum of artefacts, such as use
cases, misuse cases and attack trees [12]. The work of Mellado et al. proposed the
Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP) using the Common Criteria
(ISO/IEC 15408) for the software life-cycle [14]. Mouratidis and Giorgini intro-
duced the Secure Tropos approach for security and trust [18]. Compagna et al.
connected the legal requirements with security and privacy, identifying patterns
[4] and examined the relation of security with safety requirements [7]. Other
researchers extended Secure Tropos for risk management [11]. Threat modelling
was also used for security requirements with an orientation towards the role of
attacker as an actor [21]. Other researchers developed methodologies driven by
misuse cases [25] and reuse cases [24]. Yu et al. has also proposed a social on-
tology to connect software engineering with security[28]. MITRE’s knowledge
base and model, abbreviated as ATT&CKTM expresses attack phases [15] and
STIXTM is a language to gather intelligence regarding an attack, such as sus-
pected compromise and perpetrators, courses of actions and legitimate resources
used for malicious purposes [19]. These approaches are indeed very important
and focus on the elicitation and analysis of security requirements and analysis,
they do not explicitly consider recovery concepts which can range from detection
to mitigation and actual recovery. The lack of clearly incorporating security re-
quirements with recovery limits the scope and coverage of the multidimensional
character of security. Our approach attempts to provide an alignment of recov-
ery with security that will enable IRTs to be more versatile and ready to face
cyber-physical attacks, which initiate and propagate from the cyber domain, but
are impacting and are triggered from the physical world.
The literature also provides a large body of resources from the domain of
recovery engineering. A sustainable amount of works relevant to recovery are
concerned with the traceability of code to requirements documentation [1][27].
Business process languages have been used to analyze the relevant concepts and
identify potential gaps [22]. The disaster management meta-model (DMM) pro-
posed by Othman and Beydoum, follows the NIST segmentation of recovery
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stages [21]. Bareiss et al. introduced a model for failure recovery in order to
minimize downtime of manufacturing systems [2]. Chen et al. have examined
path-based failures [3] and Zhu et al. have used mathematical models to analyze
failure and recovery strategies [29]. Mead proposed an approach for survivable
systems separating their usage into legitimate and intrusive [13]. Hwang et. al.
have presented work for failure handling of grid work-flow [26]. These works
mainly provide advances related to safety requirements from hazards rather than
security issues related to attacks. Therefore, they have limited role in supporting
the identification of recovery requirements as part of a security-based design. Al-
though, in some cases, they might combine safety with security at a quantitative,
qualitative requirements base, they do not express how security can be an attack
vector nor how recovery can assist an attack to aggravate. Also, although these
methodologies are useful for the generation of specifications for cyber-physical
systems they usually do not consider the human factor in the loop, that might
be needed when everything else has failed and can also be the one initiating the
security failures.
5 Conclusion
The proposed secure recovery modelling language in this paper enables IRTs
to plan as part of their normal operations, in long and short time-frames, how
they can securely recover under attack conditions, without causing more harm.
We have defined a security modelling language to capture recovery and cyber-
physical systems concepts (C1 and C2). The detailed relationships and attributes
give to the language representational capabilities. By using the graphical no-
tation (C3) in the case study, a shared understanding of a CPS and how it
can recover can be designed and shared. The textual notation that underpins
the graphical syntax allows decision-support with semi-formal representation of
the language components towards automation, providing models in a machine-
readable format. Reflecting on the current stage of this work, current limitations
are the health-care focus and cyber-physical attacks modelling. This though does
not mean that the modeling language is not suitable for other critical infrastruc-
tures, as its specialization is mainly at the level of attributes. From a social
engineering attacks point of view, they can be modeled currently under the con-
cept Attack as in the case study with the direct e-mail, along with other types
of attacks. The focus remains though on the cyber-physical incidents. It is also
necessary to provide in the future a systematic analysis that will structure the
currently undefined implementation and usage of the language. Future work will
emphasize on the semi-automated analysis and the formation of a process that
will generate through instances of the SIRML optimal secure recovery plans for
given CPS, threat circumstances and constraints. There one of the main chal-
lenges is expected to be the practical implementation of the language, which will
possibly be supported through a tool.
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